

International Studies
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Aspects of the Allied Occupation
of Japan

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
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Aspects of the Allied Occupation
of Japan

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 'Working with MacArthur: Sir Alvary Gascoigne, UKLIM
 and British Policy towards Occupied Japan, 1945-52' p. 1
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 'Sir Carl Berendsen and Japan' p. 15
- Hans Baerwald Professor of Political Science,
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 'Reminiscences of a Mis-spent Youth: Tokyo 1946-1949' p. 27

Preface

A Suntory-Toyota Symposium was held on 13 December 1985 at the International Centre for Economic and Related Disciplines on the subject of the allied occupation of Japan in the presence of a large international audience. The three papers which were presented concerned personalities involved in the wider ramifications of the Japanese occupation.

The Centre is grateful to the scholars who presented papers for agreeing to their being included in this series. The authors retain full rights in the papers here presented. Any extensive quotation from them should not be published without permission of the authors.

Copies of earlier discussion papers in the International Studies series, 'The Russian Problem in East Asia', 'Bakumatsu and Meiji: Studies in Japan's Economic and Social History', 'The East Asian Crisis, 1945-1951 The Problem of China, Korea and Japan', 'Some Aspects of Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1930s', 'Whitehall: Some Personal Reflections' (Lord Bancroft), 'Aspects of Anglo-Korean Relations Part Two', 'The Tripartite Pact of 1940: Japan, Germany and Italy', '1945 in South-East Asia Part One', '1945 in South-East Asia Part Two' and 'Anglo-Japanese Naval Relations' may be obtained by writing to the Secretary, Suntory-Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, 10 Portugal Street, London WC2A 2HD. The discussion papers 'Indonesian Experience: The Role of Japan and Britain, 1943-1948', 'Some Foreign Attitudes to Republican China', 'The British Commonwealth and the Occupation of Japan', and 'Some Aspects of Anglo-Korean Relations Part One' are now out of print.

Ian Nish
February 1986

WORKING WITH MACARTHUR: SIR ALVARY GASCOIGNE, UKLIM and BRITISH POLICY
towards OCCUPIED JAPAN, 1945-52

by

Roger Buckley

'As I am leaving Japan to-morrow on transfer to another post, I feel that it is appropriate for me to add an expression of my own feelings towards this remarkable American general - despite the numerous occasions upon which I have had cause to report to you about him.' So began Sir Alvary Gascoigne's final summation of his lengthy dealings with MacArthur.¹ Few people were as well qualified as Gascoigne to attempt such a pen portrait. Gascoigne, who had been head of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan (UKLIM) from the summer of 1946 until February 1951, was at last able to break free of earlier constraint and speak his mind on MacArthur and his handiwork in occupied Japan. It was a decidedly mixed verdict that tells one much about British foreign policy objectives during the occupation and reveals something of Gascoigne's own personality and his approaches to the highly sensitive and imposing figure of MacArthur.

To begin at the end of the story. Gascoigne claimed that 'my personal relations with MacArthur have been, overtly, of the best, even if at times our official views were diametrically opposed. I have, all along, had to work with a dictator whose every word was law, even in Washington'. The need to gain and retain MacArthur's trust was the basis for Gascoigne's work in Japan. As he explained to the foreign secretary:

The possibility therefore of our carrying out any useful work at all in connexion with the occupation of Japan depended upon the maintenance of good relations with MacArthur himself, for his numerous satellite generals and officers most completely reflected his likes and dislikes upon all with whom they had to work.²

Put simply, British strategy for the occupation was dependent on a close working relationship between the supreme commander and the head of the British mission. Gascoigne needed MacArthur's cooperation; he had to persuade MacArthur that British assistance would contribute to the success of the occupation. It was probably the correct ploy under the circumstances but it placed a heavy burden on Gascoigne and left him exposed and unable to devise alternative schemes when MacArthur turned sour during the Korean war. If MacArthur had Japan in his pocket and if UKLIM was eager to go along with the supreme commander, it followed that any damage to British ties with MacArthur would necessarily hamper British diplomacy. Limits on

British access to MacArthur and his senior advisors could only constrain London's influence on the direction of the occupation and post-occupation Japan.

The gamble did come unstuck in 1951. Gascoigne had to report that British political and press attacks over MacArthur's conduct of the Korean war and divergent stances towards the China question had severely hampered his links with MacArthur. There can be little doubt that the ending of Gascoigne's term in Tokyo was inglorious. MacArthur, feeling slighted by the British government, refused to see Gascoigne off at Haneda. Gascoigne, of course, was not personally to blame for this state of affairs, but he did serve as a convenient symbol of what MacArthur took to be British irresponsibility. Yet Gascoigne's comments on MacArthur were characteristically mild. Gascoigne was (somehow) able to bite his tongue. His successor, who was a more junior diplomat, wrote to Secretary Morrison in May 1951 in more forthright terms in order to underline what the Foreign Office thought of MacArthur's recent behaviour. His report on the 'character and personality of General MacArthur'³ spoke of the 'degeneration' of MacArthur's mind, his 'overdeveloped vanity' that may have contributed to 'tragically declining' powers and the behaviour of 'a chronic megalomaniac'.⁴ The Korean war had taken its toll. Even Gascoigne had stressed that MacArthur 'has made serious mistakes both in Japan itself and in his recent conduct of the Korean war and in his attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek, and this is due in great measure, I believe, to his jealous nature and his overweening conceit and confidence in his own judgment'.⁵ Yet Gascoigne could not bring himself to ignore the more productive years when Japan had been at MacArthur's mercy and Britain had been eager to gain his goodwill. Gascoigne was scrupulously fair in his farewell despatch. He balanced the failure of MacArthur, even when prompted by Gascoigne, to allude to Anglo-American friendship in their final interview with a concluding sentence that spoke confidently of later judgments on MacArthur:

it will, I believe, become clear that, in the main, his successes outweigh his failures and one thing is, I am sure, completely clear, namely, that he recognises the overriding necessity for Anglo-United States co-operation despite the fact that by many of his actions he had tended to bring about uneasiness in our relations in this part of Asia.⁶

This paper attempts to answer the following general questions. What were Gascoigne's responsibilities and accomplishments as head of UKLIM? Were the objectives of the British government in occupied Japan realistic in the

light of Britain's diminished position in international affairs in the immediate postwar years? Was the result an accurate match of ends and means or was there no more than grudging (and unwelcome) recognition that others had got all the cards? Finally, to pose the same question in a different form, was the occupation period for Britain seen as an appreciation of the lessons of the Pacific war and acceptance that Britain, to employ Sir Esler Denning's phrase of March 1953, could aspire only to 'influence without power'?⁷

Gascoigne arrived in Tokyo in July 1946. He was far from the automatic choice for the post, since British records suggest that Esler Denning and Sir George Sansom were the leading candidates for the job. Why was Gascoigne the eventual selection? It may be that a combination of his ability and negative factors with regard to his rivals earned him the post. Denning was known to have crossed swords with W. MacMahon Ball in the Dutch East Indies during the war and the Foreign Office wished to avoid any repetition with the man picked by Canberra to represent the Commonwealth on the Allied Council for Japan. (In fact, though Ball was all too quickly seen to be a touchy individual, most of the senior Australian figures in the occupation were to feel aggrieved by British behaviour towards its Pacific ally.) Australian relations with Britain were generally a disaster during the occupation, where the blame lies has yet to be determined.⁸ The most experienced British diplomat with regard to Japan was, of course, Sansom but he was sent instead to Washington to head the British contingent working on the Far Eastern Commission. It is difficult not to regard Sansom's American appointment as something of a demotion, since it had been apparent from the moment that MacArthur landed at Atsugi that the supreme commander would not take kindly to American, let alone international, interference. It is, I am afraid, probable that Sansom was put out to grass at the FEC to repay him for his less than inspired reporting on American pre-surrender planning for occupied Japan.

Gascoigne was a compromise candidate who had not blotted his copybook. The PRO files do not give much away here but it may have been that his lack of experience of Japan (aside from one tour in Tokyo between 1931 and 1934) weighed less heavily than his knowledge of wider issues. Gascoigne had headed the British control mission in Budapest and his appointment may have been intended to stress Western cooperation in the region and general suspicion with regard to Moscow's intentions in Japan. If the Foreign Office had had any hopes of an allied control scheme for Japan, these were surely extinguished by the time Gascoigne reached Japan.

The outlines of British policy towards the occupation had been set before Gascoigne arrived in Tokyo. The necessity of keeping in with MacArthur and his staff at SCAP GHQ has been realized from the first days of the business. British officials in the autumn of 1945 had had no choice but to gain American goodwill, since the problems created by the devastation of Japan's cities could only be resolved through American military cooperation. Similar policies continued even after the strength of the British mission was built up and logistical difficulties overcome. MacArthur was running the occupation and British diplomats could never afford to ignore this reality. The Prime Minister's Personal Representative to MacArthur, Sir Charles Gairdner, was to write later that MacArthur quickly had 'complete control over affairs'.⁹ It was Gascoigne's task to build on the foundations already in place; for this he would need the support of UKLIM and Gairdner. Gascoigne's approach was to take note of precedent and use his considerable patience to strengthen existing links with American officials. Senior American staff, such as Charles Kades, the deputy chief of SCAP's important Government Section, have also endorsed the British strategy. Kades noted earlier this year in reply to questions over Gascoigne's dealings with GHQ:

I agree with the British Mission that it was MacArthur's occupation and that the staff was there to carry out his ideas. That is not to say that MacArthur did not solicit and listen to advice from staff sections but, once a command decision had been made by MacArthur, the staff's function was to put it into effect. In reaching his decisions, MacArthur considered the directives from Washington as guidelines and not direct orders to be carried out and he never hesitated to argue with Washington about any particular provision in a directive which he thought called for an unsound policy and his views during the time I was at GHQ were always accepted.¹⁰

The implications for Gascoigne's task were clear. MacArthur was seen to be in command and approaches to him, in person if possible, could pay dividends. Conversely there might be difficulties if alternative routes were employed. British actions in Washington or through the American embassy in London could complicate the picture and disrupt attempts to court MacArthur. MacArthur's distrust of the State Department - he treated its senior representative in Tokyo shabbily - was hardly a secret.

Gascoigne met MacArthur for the first time in September 1946.¹¹ He did so, knowing full well that MacArthur had to be handled with the utmost care. Success or Failure for British interests (and Gascoigne's own career)

depended on first maintaining and then enlarging on earlier cooperation. It was from the start a perilous undertaking. MacArthur was prickly, a poor listener and not ready to be corrected by his own entourage, let alone representatives of foreign governments. Gascoigne operated on the principle that gradualism was the only way forward. He was hypercautious; he said nothing that could be taken as the mildest of rebukes. In all this the Foreign Office rarely demurred. The alternatives were considered too dangerous. Deference ruled.

Yet did the strategy work? Would alternative ventures have been worth the risk? One way of answering this question is to examine the results of Gascoigne's quiet diplomacy and compare them with the occasions when Gascoigne felt it necessary to raise his voice. British objectives in Japan were ambitious. Gascoigne was instructed to enlarge British influence and promote London's political, economic and cultural interests. For Gascoigne all roads led to the Dai-Ichi building and the gaining of MacArthur's confidence.

At the beginning and the end of the Allied occupation the international context had considerable importance for the cabinet and Foreign Office.¹² But for the middle years (1946 to 1949) the primary British concern was economic. Gascoigne inherited the problems of gaining the earliest possible return of British traders and bankers to Japan, knowing that progress had so far been slow and that action was necessary both to reduce American dominance of Japan's economic future and to combat the pressure from commercial and parliamentary lobbyists in the City and Westminster. Gascoigne's method was to wait until he could find the moment to bring up sensitive issues and to press ahead only when MacArthur appeared receptive. The results over trade were generally successful. American documents do on occasion even comment that MacArthur had a tendency to side with the British.¹³ A good case, carefully presented, might gain his approval, though such tactics depended on frequent access to MacArthur and assumed that SCAP's directives would then be carried out by his staff. Gascoigne, aided by his economic advisers, won a number of concessions of some importance. Traders were permitted to return in the summer of 1947 and a counterbalance to American commerce was erected on a limited scale.

A second and complimentary measure to the relaxation on trading restrictions was MacArthur's approval of a series of Sterling Area Agreements for Japan and most Commonwealth nations. These trade packages

have been ignored by economists working on the history of the occupation but they had a role to play in Japanese reconstruction, since Japan's overseas trade was necessarily directed towards Asian markets and frequently on a Sterling basis. The major factor limiting British territories and Japan from enlarging their prewar trading links was the question of foreign exchange and Tokyo's wish to convert its Sterling balances into dollars. Although the Foreign Office spoke of SCAP GHQ as being opposed to the encouragement of a Sterling bloc, the evidence suggests that MacArthur himself did what he could to facilitate British trade with Japan. MacArthur's own personal wish to dissolve the Zaibatsu and keep United States financial interests from exploiting a weak Japan may have been linked to personal issues, such as the ties of his first wife to J.P. Morgan & Co. and complaints that he voiced to members of UKLIM concerning the influence of Wall Street in concentrating attention on Germany's revival. None of this prevented press sceptics from noting that numerous members of his staff were old hands from the Tokyo American Club.¹⁴ Later there were to be fears from some in SCAP GHQ that the devaluation of the pound in 1949 would unfairly assist British exporters and lead, for example, to the loss of Pan American's hoped for contract to initiate a Japanese domestic air service.¹⁵

Anglo-American commercial rivalry persisted throughout the occupation. Trade disputes could also involve areas where UKLIM held that MacArthur and his men were being unnecessarily sympathetic towards Japan. Certainly by 1949 there was concern in the Foreign Office that the United States was changing direction in its economic policies with regard to Japan and that such actions might create difficulties for sections of the British economy. UKLIM had to explain to MacArthur that London was not prepared to agree to MPN treatment for Japan, despite numerous attempts by the United States government to change British and Commonwealth thinking.¹⁶ The crucial role of textiles in Japan's foreign trade was an additional factor behind British wariness. Bevin and the Foreign Office had no wish to block Japanese exports to southeast Asia; if Japan did not supply the incentive goods no one else would, but domestic political pressures were increasingly felt as the occupation lengthened. Lancashire had been dethroned in the 1930s¹⁷ and was understandably reluctant to let Japan win back its crown after the war. Textiles after all comprised approximately 50% of Japan's exports in 1950 (almost exactly the same figure as in the 1930s) and any loss of east Asian markets had been compensated for by greater attention to Indian and European customers.¹⁸ In such debates MacArthur generally sided

with Japan. His first responsibility was to secure its economic well-being and in so doing he might have to reject any curbs on Japanese textile spindleage and later refuse to place tonnage limits on ships constructed in Japanese yards.

Gascoigne undoubtedly held a testing post as head of UKLIM. He needed MacArthur's assent for many of his proposals and in the area of trade he had some successes. But was he too patient? Did he overdo the caution? When he went on the offensive, however, things could turn out to his disadvantage. One notorious example was MacArthur's behaviour with regard to British attempts to persuade SCAP that Japanese civil servants ought to be granted a wide range of bargaining rights. In this the British government recalled its own (and Australian) practices but perhaps pressed too hard on MacArthur and his staff. The result of Gascoigne's attempts to alter Japanese trade union legislation was a decided failure. The interview with MacArthur in September 1948 was:

the most painful one which I have yet had with him during my duty in Japan. The mere mention by me of National Public Service draft legislation and our opinion thereon caused him to shout at me without stopping for one and threequarter hours.¹⁹

MacArthur's edginess over adverse comment never altered. Even before the Korean war added to Anglo-American differences, the drawbridge would go up and the demand for retractions be issued. MacArthur read press stories from Britain with attention. Criticism in the early days of the occupation in one of the Sunday papers that MacArthur was no more than the "Hollywood General" led to SCAP complaining to Gairdner. Likewise in June 1950 MacArthur's aide, Colonel Bunker, called on Gascoigne to complain of an AP despatch from London that quoted the chairman of P & O as claiming that British shipping lines were facing unfair competition from Japan.²⁰

Gascoigne employed patience and tact in his dealings with MacArthur and was able to win his confidence. This can be demonstrated in such diverse fields as rehearsing with the general what he was to state publicly to the Press Club in his famous March 1947 speech urging an early peace on his own government, gaining the approval of scarce coal supplies to Hong Kong and the welcome given to British visitors by MacArthur. It is doubtful whether anything but the soft approach would have paid off in the long term, but one major disadvantage of this conformity was the restraints it imposed on Anglo-Japanese contacts. Here the record of UKLIM and Gascoigne is suspect. The mission was necessarily the main source of information for the Foreign

Office on events within Japan but it was technically obliged to go through, rather than round, SCAP GHQ in its dealings with Japanese politicians and businessmen. Gascoigne appears to have behaved punctiliously in order to avoid jeopardizing his relationship with MacArthur. The result, until late in the day, was that British contacts with Japanese were only slowly restored. Gascoigne's own personal attitude towards Japan and its future was an additional drawback. The head of UKLIM was far from a Japanophile. He said privately to The Times correspondent in 1947 that Allied troops ought to be stationed in Japan for the next 50 years and, though he had later to change his mind because of the obvious American objections to any post-peace treaty controls, it is clear from his reports to London that his suspicions over Japan's behaviour persisted.²¹ In this Gascoigne was once again continuing with doubts about Japan that Sansom had voiced during the war and which were to echo on after San Francisco. The interim charge, for example, listed Prime Minister Yoshida as 'an old man in (by European standards) a backward country'²² and Denning in his first attempt at a policy paper could bring himself only to suggest that 'in the political field, Japan is likely to remain in the Western camp for some time to come'. The persistent Foreign Office commentary on the occupation that 'the Japanese have not really changed'²³ was merely reinforced by Gascoigne. Gascoigne in his final report could only caution that 'the Japanese are materialistic and self-seeking people', whose political future was destined to be at best conservative and more probably autocratic. His prediction that 'first and foremost the Constitution will be emasculated out of all recognition' has proved unfortunate, considering that no single amendment has yet been attached to the 1947 document.²⁴

British policies towards occupied Japan faced a formidable number of limitations. The first and most obvious was the strength of the United States' position in Japan gained by its overwhelming contribution to the defeat of Japan in the Pacific war. The second was the lack of British influence on the Japanese political figures who had emerged after the surrender to cooperate with the Americans and run the reformed Japanese state and economy. The third was the general apathy displayed by the British public and press towards postwar Japan. Yet British ministers and their advisors in the Foreign Office attempted to counter these disadvantages from the summer of 1945 onwards. There is little evidence to suggest that Britain wrote off the prospect of contributing to the Allied occupation. Indeed the international manoeuvring to gain a decent say in how Japan was run points to the opposite conclusion. The newly-released

British records of the lengthy road to San Francisco underline this thesis.²⁵ In the conduct of occupation diplomacy Gascoigne and his mission had a central role. The lack of a Japanese embassy in London was keenly felt by the Foreign Office and recognized both as a serious (though of course inevitable) limitation on Anglo-Japanese ties and an additional reason for possessing a first-rate mission in Tokyo. Gascoigne was aided by the calibre of his staff, beginning with John Profumo as the first chief of staff, Vere Redman and Edmund Blunden to handle press and cultural affairs, prewar traders to aid in commercial matters and political officers who were to work their way up to being successive ambassadors to Japan for most of the next 40 years.

Gascoigne was fortunate in his staff (and the work of that neglected figure Gairdner) but this ought not to detract from his own contribution to the work of the mission. He never lost sight of the need to humour MacArthur. He saw him more frequently than any other foreign diplomat in Japan and the evidence from reports of third parties suggests that until 1950 the effort was rewarded. Even in March 1951 the New Zealand representative in Tokyo could note that:

he and his Commonwealth colleagues in Tokyo had always regarded General MacArthur as pro-British and an admirer of Britain. In the past, he had repeatedly said that he would never do anything to embarrass British policy and it therefore came to Mr. Challis as something of a shock to hear the General adopt so critical an attitude towards the United Kingdom.²⁶

The Korean war wrecked such links but for most of the occupation the ties were formidable. Gascoigne's cultivation of MacArthur was clearly at the heart of UKLIM's activities. Yet, granted that Britain took MacArthur very seriously indeed, why did MacArthur reciprocate? Why, given Britain's less than brilliant record in the Pacific fighting, did MacArthur read British press commentaries, learn of parliamentary questions and have the courtesy to meet and entertain Gascoigne and Gairdner, colonial governors and cottonmen, visiting journalists and bankers? In the light of Britain's subsequent slide in east Asia, it is difficult not to wonder if MacArthur overvalued Britain's assistance and opinions. Part of the explanation may be that important parts of the British perspective on occupied Japan coincided with views he held and endlessly enunciated. Hopes for a nonvindictive occupation, retention of the Emperor and an early peace were shared by both sides, though British doubts on the possibility of an induced revolution in Japan, unless support was forthcoming from within

Japanese society, had to be carefully backpedalled when speaking to MacArthur. The fact that much of British occupation policy coincided with ideas reached independently by SCAP was a useful cement, but the reverse, of course, applied when Gascoigne and MacArthur came to different conclusions.

By 1950 it is possible to detect a weakening in MacArthur's authority over Japan and rather more occasions when Gascoigne was able to assert himself. In part this was inevitably the result of MacArthur's necessary preoccupation with the Korean war but hints emerge that suggest SCAP was no longer having things his own way. Now it is MacArthur who approaches Gascoigne to obtain information on British and Commonwealth policies with regard to a future peace settlement. The appointment of Dulles to formulate an American position and to negotiate with Allied governments leaves MacArthur out of the picture. The stilted language employed by both Dulles and MacArthur when the Dulles mission arrived in Tokyo in January 1951 suggests that neither felt at ease with the other.²⁷ MacArthur's estimate that Dulles would find 'the reaching of satisfactory understandings with the Japanese the easiest part of his entire task' was not to prove quite the case; nor were his guesses on how Britain, India and the Soviet Union would react any more accurate.²⁸ His remark that 'the British can be expected to be implacable in their determination to handicap Japan as a commercial competitor' was simply wrong and perhaps MacArthur knew it. His very next remark to Dulles was far more complimentary with regard to British behaviour 'during their period of world dominion' and was meant to encourage his own nation to follow earlier practices of global powers without excessive scruple.

Dulles' repeated visits to Tokyo certainly enhanced the importance of Gascoigne and his successor. On one occasion Dulles' staff suggested (unsuccessfully) that Gascoigne ought not to be permitted a third interview with Dulles. Gascoigne may have been slightly trusting in some of his comments, such as when he explained that Dulles had 'talked to us with complete openness and freedom concealing from us nothing so far as we know',²⁹ but he was authorized by London to speak at length on British thinking and the results of the recent Colombo Commonwealth conference. Gascoigne was also instructed to comment on British opposition to a Pacific Defence Council.³⁰ Dulles was later to inform Ambassador Franks in Washington that Gascoigne's arguments had been 'very cogent' in ruling against a Pacific offshore pact. Dulles for his part explained to Gascoigne

that some form of regional security scheme would be necessary to gain Australian and New Zealand agreement to the peace treaty, while giving Japan 'the opportunity to develop again within our orbit as a first class power. To deny this would be to lose Japan and thus the whole Pacific area.'³¹ The American record makes it clear that the United States dropped its idea of incorporating a Pacific Defence Council or a US-Japan security agreement into the Japanese peace treaty at Dulles' meeting with Gascoigne.³² Gascoigne has thus indirectly become a midwife to the future ANZUS pact.

For four and a half years Gascoigne had the challenging task of sustaining Anglo-American ties in Japan on the basis of his personal relations with General MacArthur. Until the Korean war broke out Gascoigne made the best of a bad hand. Assisted by MacArthur's own sentiments towards Britain and the fact that MacArthur was susceptible to flattery, liked an audience and welcomed support, Gascoigne oiled the wheels and kept things generally smooth until the Korean war derailed the train. When times were less critical the scheme worked, but no diplomat, however astute or experienced, could do the impossible. And Gascoigne? He was rewarded for his valour in Japan with the Moscow embassy. Stalin replaced MacArthur; one hardship post was exchanged for another.

Footnotes

- 1 Sir Alvary Gascoigne to Ernest Bevin 'Impressions of General MacArthur' (secret), 6 February 1951, F1017/5(F0371/92061).
- 2 *ibid.*
- 3 George Clutton to Herbert Morrison 'Character and Personality of General MacArthur' (secret), 30 April 1951, F1017/17(F0371/92061). Morrison minuted 'most interesting. Were we told all this while MacA[rthur] was in Japan and GOC in Korea?' Morrison, 3 June 1951, *ibid.*
- 4 See also correspondence from Professor Allen S. Whiting to the editor Pacific Affairs, vol. 56, No.4, winter 1983-4. Whiting wrote in response to a review of Joseph C. Goulden's Korea: The Untold Story of the War (paperback ed., New York, 1983). The medical evidence, as Whiting is careful to note, would require assessment by those professionally qualified to 'judge the degree to which the General's psychological state impaired his grasp of reality and his reaction to it'. Whiting's picture was never written up 'because it was so damning with respect to General MacArthur's emotional state and unprofessional behaviour that I saw no chance of it ever being cleared for general distribution, and I would not write a book to be locked up in secret files'.
- 5 Gascoigne to Bevin, 6 February 1951, *op. cit.*
- 6 *ibid.*
- 7 Sir Esler Dening, 24 March 1953, FJ1051/21(F0371/105374).
- 8 Work in progress by Dr. Jeffrey Grey of the University of New South Wales testifies to other Commonwealth difficulties that were in no way linked to Ball. I am grateful to him for a copy of his paper 'A Special Facility for Doing the Opposite.' General Robertson's Command in Japan, 1950-51', presented to the Historians of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy Association conference, 5 July 1985.
- 9 Sir Charles Gairdner to author, 16 September 1980.
- 10 Charles Kades to author, 6 September 1985. Reproduced by permission. I am grateful for the continual interest (and friendship) that Mr. Kades has taken in clarifying matters relating to his role and knowledge of occupation events.
- 11 Gascoigne to FO, 9 September 1946, F13031/2/23(F0371/54105).
- 12 See author Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945-1952 (Cambridge, 1982) chapters 3, 10 and 11. For wider accounts of government interest in the region see Gordon Daniels 'The British Cabinet and East Asia, 1945-50' in Hosoya Chihiro (ed.) Japan and Postwar Diplomacy in the Asian-Pacific Region (International University of Japan Occasional Papers No. 1, Urasa, 1984), also D.C. Watt 'Britain and the Cold War in the Far East, 1945-58' in Nagai Yonosuke & Iriye Akira (eds.) The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo, 1977). Professor Hosoya Chihiro has covered much of the international debate

in a series of articles (both in Japanese and English) and in his San Francisco kowa e no michi (Tokyo, 1984). Dr. Peter Lowe is at work on the origins of the Korean War. See his 'Great Britain, Japan and the Korean War, 1950-1951' in Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, 1984 and 'British Attitudes to General MacArthur and Japan, 1948-51' in Gordon Daniels (ed.) Europe Interprets Japan (Tenterden, Kent 1984). Roger Dingman is working on the Japanese peace treaty. See his contribution 'Truman, Attlee and the Korean War Crisis' in Ian Nish (ed.), The East Asian Crisis, 1945-1951: The Problem of China, Korea and Japan (LSE, Suntory-Toyota Foundation, 1982).

- 13 See author, op.cit. p.251, footnote 33.
- 14 A.B. Jamieson in Melbourne Argus 16 March 1946, Record Group 9, Box 6, MacArthur Memorial Archives.
- 15 SCAP GHQ to Department of the Army, Washington DC, 12 January 1950. MacArthur's staff suggested that an American plan devised before any peace treaty were signed might give the edge to the United States, since 'delay in [the] formulation of a policy may well result in placing American carriers in an unfavourable position when such service is under consideration by the Japanese'. Record Group 9, Box 89, FEC file May 1949 - June 1950, MacArthur Memorial.
- 16 See Occupation Diplomacy, pp. 163-170 for British reactions to American changes in economic policies after 1948. On MPN see author, 'Joining the Club: The Japanese Question and Anglo-American Peace Diplomacy, 1950-1951' Modern Asian Studies, 19, 2 (1985). For text of aide memoire from Acheson to British government, 19 June 1949, see Record Group 9, Box 89, MacArthur Memorial.
- 17 The phrase is Gary Saxonhouse's. See his 'Country Girls and Communication among Competitors in the Japanese Cotton-Spinning Industry' in Hugh Patrick (ed.), Japanese Industrialization and Its Social Consequences (Berkeley, 1976). Britain feared what it regarded as unfair competition and uncertainty over how any future Yen exchange rate might damage trade. For statistics see Ohkawa Kazushi & Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth (Stanford, 1973).
- 18 Information on the UK cotton mission to Japan was provided by UKLIM to MacArthur. See delegate list, British mission file No. 3, Record Group 5, Box No. 101.
- 19 See author, 'The British Model: Institutional Reform and Occupied Japan', Modern Asian Studies, 16, 2 (1982).
- 20 For AP text and Colonel Bunker's memorandum of 2 June 1950 meeting with Gascoigne see British mission file No. 3, op.cit. MacArthur was said to be 'greatly perplexed and perturbed' by the report. P & O's chairman was Sir William Crawford Currie.
- 21 Frank Hawley, The Times correspondent, was later to be defended by Gascoigne when criticised sharply by MacArthur. Hawley's views on Japan were doubtless coloured by his arrest and confinement by the Japanese police after the Pacific war began.
- 22 George Clutton to Dening, FJ1022/759 (FO371/92567).
- 23 Dening to Sir William Strang, reporting on his impressions of occupied Japan while touring east Asia, 8 December 1950,

FJ1021/2/7(FO371/83837). In the same cable Dening praised Gascoigne for having 'put us back on the map' by working 'unobtrusively in circumstances of great difficulty'. Dening, who had the trust of Bevin on Asian business, was not one to dish out accolades.

- 24 Gascoigne to Foreign Office, 26 November 1950, FJ1021/G224(FO371/83838). He also thought that the Emperor would return to a larger role.
- 25 See author 'Joining the Club: The Japanese Question and Anglo-American Peace Diplomacy' op.cit., also author 'Gambling on Japan: the British Press and the San Francisco Peace Settlements' in Commemorative Issue in Honour of President Okita Saburo, Bulletin of the Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan, No. 2, December 1984.
- 26 Summary of conversation between UK Commissioner-General South East Asia, Singapore, and Mr. Challis, Representative New Zealand Government in Tokyo, 30 March 1951, F1017/14/G(FO371/92061). MacArthur's comment on Britain's far eastern policy was bitter indeed. He accused the government of "appeasement" in Korea and Taiwan.
- 27 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, volume VI, part 1, memorandum of conversation, by Robert Fearey, of Dulles-MacArthur on peace progress, Tokyo, 27 January 1951.
- 28 ibid.
- 29 Gascoigne to Foreign Office, 9 February 1951, FJ1022/59(FO371/92531). Dulles was in fact cautioning Tokyo that it must side with the United States or face problems from Britain.
- 30 See Gascoigne to Foreign Office, 7 February 1951, FJ1022/55G(FO371/92531).
- 31 ibid.
- 32 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, volume VI, part 1, memorandum of Dulles - Gascoigne conversation, 2 February 1951. Gascoigne explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were opposed to incorporating defence pacts within a peace treaty. (This had always been Bevin's view from 1947 onwards and gives strength to the suggestion that the foreign secretary ought not to be seen as under the thumb of his officials on all east Asian matters). Gascoigne reported back to London that he had spoken 'most strongly against the establishment of any Pacific defence organization which excluded the United Kingdom'. Gascoigne to Foreign Office, 4 February 1951, FJ1022/46(FO371/92529).

SIR CARL BERENDSEN AND JAPAN

by

Ann Trotter

Sir Carl Berendsen became New Zealand's Minister in Washington in 1944. New Zealand had opened a Legation there in 1942, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and the attack on Singapore having presented New Zealand with a 'new high in lows'¹ and thereby underlined the urgency of having representation there. Circumstances, as the New Zealand Prime Minister commented when the British government at first objected to the opening of this post, were forcing a new point of view on New Zealand and, he believed, Australia.² Australia had opened an embassy in Washington in March 1940. Now the entry of Japan into the war raised the level of 'Pacific consciousness' in New Zealand although this consciousness was, of course, much stronger in government circles than among the public at large.³ The post in Washington was a signal that New Zealand was beginning to consider just what its interests were. The simple proposition of relying on Britain as its 'shield and buckler', as Berendsen described it,⁴ was no longer enough, and new relationships, primarily with the United States but also with Australia, had to be worked out.⁵ Berendsen in fact went to Washington from Canberra where he had opened New Zealand's first High Commission there in 1943.

Berendsen arrived in Washington with the confidence born of quite exceptional experience. He had from 1926 articulated and, to a large extent, formulated New Zealand foreign policy as, successively, Imperial Affairs Officer (1926), Secretary for External Affairs (1928), permanent head of the Prime Minister's department (1932-43) and Secretary to the War Cabinet (1939-43). In these posts Berendsen directed New Zealand policy not just towards Britain, the Commonwealth and the League of Nations, but also towards Samoa, New Zealand's mandated territory for the administration of which he was responsible. He was a back-room man and for much of these seventeen years dealt with New Zealand's external relations single-handed.⁶ Berendsen was tremendously well-informed in matters of New Zealand policy and vastly more experienced than anyone else in the New Zealand Legation in Washington and its delegation to the United Nations. It is not surprising that he had a very clear idea about the role New Zealand, as a small nation, might play on the world stage. After years of anonymity as an advisor and speech-writer, Berendsen at last acquired, at the United Nations in particular, a platform for his ideas and a captive audience. He

plunged into life in America with great enthusiasm.

Berendsen has variously been described as pugnacious, dogmatic, aggressive, obsessive, passionate, active, self-confident and voluble.⁷ He was also hardworking, tremendously able, fiery-tempered, and a prima donna. None of this made him easy to work with. Socially he had a bluff, hearty, hail-fellow-well-met manner and he was soon well known on the Washington and United Nations scene but he seems to have had few, if any, friends in the United Nations or, indeed, in New Zealand. If there is a New Zealand personality, passion, emotion and obsession are not usually associated with it.⁸ Berendsen was, in fact, an Australian who had come to New Zealand with his parents in 1900 at the age of ten. Be that as it may, his vitality and showmanship and his love for their country appealed to Americans. As a representative of a small 'reliable' nation with a 'good' war record and because of his own qualities of intelligence, vigour and outspokenness, Berendsen was well-received in Washington and was frequently useful to the American administration in the early years of the United Nations.

Berendsen began with high hopes of the United Nations, believing, as he did, that collective security could and must be made to work if peace was to be maintained. This support for the principle of collective security dated back to pre-war years. Although a profoundly conservative man in matters of domestic politics, Berendsen seems to have embraced Labour Party ideas on the League of Nations as the only means of securing a just and lasting peace, when Labour took office in New Zealand in 1935. He is credited with the design of New Zealand's attempts, after that time, to make the Covenant more effective and to urge the League into action over China, Abyssinia, and Spain.⁹ New Zealand's rather grand gestures at the League in the thirties won it a certain notoriety at the time and are typical of a foreign policy style which New Zealand has not altogether lost and which Berendsen, the actor, relished.

His experiences in the thirties imbued Berendsen with a hatred of the readiness to compromise which he associated with appeasement. Not himself one for doubts, Berendsen hated those he described as 'weathervanes' and always advocated resolution rather than resolutions.¹⁰ His view of the world was clear and rather simple. Peace-loving nations had a duty to stand up to aggression whenever it occurred; small countries had the right and the duty to make their voices heard in the peace-keeping process.

His experience of the machinations of Great Powers in the League and his well-established beliefs made Berendsen an enemy of the Great Power veto in the United Nations. He fought an unrelenting campaign against the veto and spoke against it at every opportunity. This concern over the paralysing effect of the veto and the disproportionate power it gave to the Big Five helps explain, in part at least, the vehemence of the anti-Soviet sentiments that, ultimately, Berendsen came to express. He saw, in the shadow of the veto and in particular in the Soviet use of it, the decline and fall of the UN and the world's hope for a system of collective security.

In 1945 Berendsen was appointed New Zealand's delegate to the newly-established Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC) in Washington, the body consisting of delegates from eleven nations which had participated in the defeat of Japan that was set up to formulate policy for the fulfilment of the terms of surrender and to keep a check on the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan. It was absolutely characteristic that two of his first actions as a delegate in that body should have been an objection to the right of veto given to the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China in the FEAC, and an expression of anxiety that small nations should be accorded their appropriate and proportionate voice.¹¹ These concerns were part of his mental baggage at that time.

Another aspect of Berendsen's mental baggage in 1945 was his attitude to Asian people. It was an attitude he shared with most New Zealanders of his generation whose education had a strong flavour of Kipling and the Boys Own paper. Successive New Zealand governments and white New Zealanders prided themselves, until relatively recently, on the good race relations in their country. The concept of racial harmony did not, however, extend to Asian people in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. New Zealanders were afraid of the 'Yellow Peril', the countless millions believed to be waiting to swarm down from Asia to the thinly populated lands of the South Pacific. In the 1890s and early twentieth century extreme racial hatred was extended against 'Asiatics', especially Chinese people.¹² Of Japan and the Japanese New Zealanders knew very little. There was some trade before the war, mainly in wool, but very little other contact. The unattractive Japanese stereotype described in an article, intended to be educational, entitled 'How to tell friends from enemies' carried in the New Zealand Listener, a respected journal, in April 1942 reflects an ignorance, lack of sophistication and hostility in New Zealand attitudes to Asian people for

which the war alone was not responsible.¹³ Such attitudes carried over into New Zealand's concept of how post-war Japan should be treated.

When Berendsen was appointed to the FEAC the New Zealand Government noted:

We think it necessary to assume (until there is unmistakable evidence to the contrary) that plans for expansion will continue to be fostered by an influential nucleus among the Japanese population, that the latent response to aggressive leadership, should favourable prospects return, will be general, and that this combination of circumstances, given the military and technical capacities of the Japanese people, threatens not only the general peace of the Pacific, but the direct physical security of New Zealand.¹⁴

This was a view Berendsen shared in 1945 and did not essentially change.

In January 1946 Berendsen went with the FEAC Commission to Japan. Of course he was shocked by the devastation of Tokyo and Hiroshima. But he was also obviously deeply impressed and surprised by many aspects of Japanese culture, by the simplicity and economy of Japanese art, the beauty of Japanese temple gardens, the lines of the Torii - the gateways to Shinto shrines. His appreciation was, however, tempered with some typically western and Baden Powellesque criticism of the Japanese life-style. After a lyrical description of paddy fields and green young plants, of picturesque division of the land into square and oblong fields, of the terracing of hillsides, of little thatched villages, he comments, for example, 'It is a painful thought that anything so beautiful should be so completely unsanitary'.¹⁵

The Commission was of course briefed by MacArthur and his assistants. Of MacArthur the man Berendsen was less than complimentary, having no patience with his 'carefully staged' appearances and the atmosphere of 'reverent worship' which surrounded him.¹⁶ With MacArthur's work in Japan he was, however, impressed. All the same, Berendsen doubted whether, in spite of MacArthur's best efforts, all traces of militarism would disappear and consequently he believed the Occupation should last at least twenty years. He also believed that there should be a commitment by the signatories of any peace treaty to the enforcement of its terms.¹⁷ He did not believe, as he put it, that the leopard, i.e. Japan, had changed or would change its spots.

He wrote later

I am not one of those who believe that this warlike people, trained to a tradition of warfare and conquest, who sought to impose their will on the world, led by an Emperor whom they profess to worship as a God, who made war on their neighbours with no warning, and also waged that war with a ferocity and atrocity unparalleled in the annals of infamy, who seemed to welcome rather than avoid death, who could exist and flourish on what could kill a European, and who could cover incredible distances on this nourishment and in scanty garb that we of the western world would scorn: that this enigmatical and menacing people had suddenly, overnight as it were, turned over a new leaf and transformed themselves into a smiling and obsequious race, asking for nothing but to live on terms of peace and amity with their neighbours and with all men: that such a radical change could have been achieved within a year or two as the result of the American Occupation seemed to me, as it still seems, much too good to be true, too optimistic to be safe.¹⁸

Having sat out the Occupation, he believed Japan would follow the course that promised best for Japanese interests. His great fear came to be that these interests would lead Japan to join the Soviet Union.

On his return to Washington Berendsen was, at first, very active in the Far East Commission. Within six months, however, he was expressing frustration with the impotence of the Commission and with the smothering tactics of General McCoy, its Chairman, with whom Berendsen, who had a ferocious temper, had some spectacular battles.¹⁹ Berendsen's ire was roused on these occasions, not simply because of what he regarded as obstructionism on the part of General McCoy, but because of the insult to New Zealand which the General's behaviour implied. He wrote

I have never allowed myself as an Ambassador to be ignored or directly or indirectly insulted or imposed upon without insisting upon the dignity of the country I had the honour to represent.²⁰

Meanwhile the work of formulating New Zealand's policy towards Japan and the Japanese peace treaty was being carried on in Wellington. As time went on there was increasing recognition there that New Zealand was unlikely to get the kind of peace treaty which Wellington felt was necessary to advance New Zealand's security interests. It was recognised that difficult choices were going to have to be made between the felt need to press for long range security controls on Japan and the necessity of maintaining good relations with the United States. It was accepted that the South Pacific was not automatically seen as within the area of United States responsibility and that there was little American awareness of New Zealand's security apprehensions. As American policy towards Japan 'softened' Wellington was

concerned with the best tactics to use to influence Washington's thinking and whether it was worth the risk of antagonising the United States by standing out for a tougher peace.²¹ It was, of course, difficult for New Zealand to influence the State Department which itself was having difficulty influencing MacArthur, but American failure to consult its allies on Occupation policy and peace settlement matters was extremely annoying and frustrating to New Zealand officials in Wellington and Washington. In this tricky situation, Berendsen was not averse to using the personal touch. In any case, he never felt he needed instructions having for years prepared New Zealand policy. Frank Corner, who was First Secretary in Washington from 1948-51 recalled Berendsen, some time in 1949, fed up with some aspect of American policy towards Japan and his inability to influence the Americans, ringing Dean Rusk, then Secretary in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs. Corner recounted the story as follows:

Berendsen said, 'Dean, I want to talk to you, want to tell you how much I dislike what you are doing in Japan and how much I dislike your whole Far Eastern policy.' There was a silence when, presumably, Rusk was saying 'Fine Carl, come along and have a chat.' Berendsen spoke again, 'No, I don't want to go along there, you come and see me. I don't want to be around all those tape recorders and your bugging and that sort of thing, you come here and let me tell you.' Rusk agreed. This was very unusual. Normally a person in his office in the capital has people call on him, he doesn't go along himself. Anyway Dean Rusk turned up and I was delegated to meet him at his car and welcome him and take him up to Carl Berendsen because nobody else was to be in the room.

So I delivered Dean Rusk to Carl up in his office and just before the door closed I heard, 'Thank you Dean, I just wanted to tell you Dean, that American policy is conceived with bad logic, carried out in bad faith and with bad manners...' and then the door closed. That was as much as I heard and then half an hour or so later I got a message that Dean Rusk was leaving so I came down again. Carl accompanied him to the front door and said, 'Oh, but it's good to see you, Dean,' and that was very much Carl Berendsen, a very explosive person with very simple, clear and vigorous ideas, with an explosive temper and with an almost embarrassing warm-heartedness and apologetic manner after the explosion was over.²²

Of course we do not know what effect such an interview may or may not have had on Dean Rusk but, to the extent that such encounters kept the concerns of New Zealand about Japan and New Zealand's security in the mind of the State Department, such an interview was clearly valuable to New Zealand's interests. It was remarkable that a New Zealand ambassador could demand and get such an interview.

By 1950 officials in Wellington accepted that the Japanese peace settlement

would not meet New Zealand's security requirements. In the debate over tactics vis-a-vis the United States, Berendsen participated largely by reacting to Wellington's requests for information and by conveying Wellington's views to American officials. By that time, given the failure of the Far East Commission, Berendsen's attention was focussed on the United Nations where he was chairman of the New Zealand delegation. He became increasingly disillusioned with the lack of resolution shown by the United Nations and even more obsessed with the veto and the obstructive tactics of Soviet delegates. Berendsen's anti-Soviet speeches became increasingly sulphurous as the Cold War intensified. He became a real 'hammer of the Communists' finally joining Churchill, Truman and others in being denounced by the Soviet bloc in the UN as a 'war monger'.²³

By the beginning of 1950 Berendsen found the entire world scene so alarming that he feared a third world war was 'a probability rather than a possibility'. For this state of affairs he blamed that group of 'international thugs and gangsters', led by the Soviet Union. Communism he declared to be 'a pestilential disease, a festering and deadly plague, born of evil and flourishing in ignorance, evil and discontent', and, as a result, providing the aggressors of the Kremlin with a 'fifth column - a Trojan horse - in every country in the world'.²⁴

Berendsen's extreme apprehensions led him to feel that the danger in the South Pacific, New Zealand's part of the world, had been tremendously increased at a time when its means of defence had been drastically reduced by the demonstrable inability of the British navy to police the area. The danger, Berendsen believed, came from the poverty and discontents of more than half of the world's population who lived in the countries of eastern and southern Asia. 'More than a thousand million people have, in our times, eked out in that area', he wrote,

an undernourished and under-privileged existence...while alongside them in Australia and New Zealand we Occidental newcomers to the area, have enjoyed infinitely higher standards of living which are common in European economies though granted to us in an unusually abundant degree.

Berendsen argued that the Asian people were now aware of the inequitable share of the good things of life which had been available to them and declared:

Today the whole of Asia is vibrant with resurgent nationalism, determined to eliminate European domination and to raise the

standard of Asiatic living to something more nearly approaching that of the European. It is a situation ideally adapted for Soviet fishing in muddy waters; it is a field ripe for the reaping of the communists.²⁵

In this situation New Zealand was, Berendsen felt, 'out on a limb', remote from help, exposed to the potential impact of a thousand million depressed people resentful of their wrongs and not difficult to convince of the desirability of attempting to redress those wrongs by adventures abroad into lands 'flowing with milk and honey'.

The prospect of Soviet control of the 'boiling cauldron in Asia' and the dashing of his hopes for a system of collective security altered Berendsen's attitude to Japan and the Japanese peace treaty. He feared that, if Japan should decide to join this 'communist conspiracy', the prospect in the Pacific would be 'gloomy indeed'. He became convinced that, on the grounds of equity, fairness and expediency, a generous and friendly peace must be offered Japan. In addition he advocated a pact with the United States. He dismissed the idea of a Pacific Pact which was being touted at that time as too likely to result in an obligation to defend countries which were indefensible. Similarly he dismissed the notion that the United States would automatically come to the aid of New Zealand and Australia. The United States had already accepted responsibility for the defence of a line in the North Pacific from, and including, Japan and the Philippines. Berendsen advocated an approach to the United States Government with the suggestion for a limited Pacific Pact extending the areas for which the United States accepted responsibility to include Australia and New Zealand. In return Australia and New Zealand would undertake to defend the northern line. Berendsen envisaged the Pact including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and perhaps the Philippines. If the United Kingdom expressed doubts about such a pact, Berendsen felt New Zealand should enter anyway. He believed the acceptance of the Philippines as an ally and a responsibility for the defence of Japan were part of the price that would have to be paid for the great benefits of the pact he was suggesting which, he thought, would 'stem the communist tide'.²⁶

It seems probable that the inordinately long despatch in which Berendsen set out these ideas will be more closely studied by historians than it was by the busy officials or the newly appointed minister of external affairs in March 1950. In his at once apologetic and mollifying personal reply to Berendsen dated 9 May, 1950, the minister indicated that Berendsen would

have his full support if he did have a chance to sound out the Americans on the lines indicated, but this was not, of course, an instruction.²⁷ A summary of Berendsen's depatch is on file in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 1 February 1951 which suggests too that the original may have been too indigestibly long and too predictably extreme to have had much influence on official thinking.²⁸

In fact the moves which would lead to a more limited pact with the United States than the one Berendsen advocated were being made in Canberra, Wellington and Washington. In neither Wellington nor Canberra was the communist threat seen as such a bogey as it was by Berendsen, and indeed by Washington. The case New Zealand and Australia made for their reluctance to sign a 'soft' Japanese Peace Treaty continued to rest on their exposure in the event of a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. Fears about the communist menace may have helped influence the United States to offer Australia and New Zealand what became known as the ANZUS pact but this 'menace' appears not to have been a major factor in Australian and New Zealand thinking.²⁹ A persistent effort by Australia in particular, resulted in the formulation, by Dulles, of the ANZUS Treaty which provides that the parties will act to meet common danger in accordance with their constitutional process.³⁰ The agreement is at once less binding and less burdensome than the arrangement Berendsen had suggested and he did not claim to have any real part in the formulation of the ANZUS treaty.³¹

Berendsen's last assignment of importance as New Zealand's ambassador in the United States was the signing, on New Zealand's behalf, of the ANZUS Security Treaty and the Japanese Peace Treaty. As a well-known supporter of the United States, experienced conference man and, no doubt, as the delegate of a small country, Berendsen was asked, by Dean Rusk, then Assistant Secretary of State, to request the floor and move the adoption of the Rules of Procedure immediately after the chairman's opening remarks and so pre-empt any Russian attempt to sabotage the conference in the absence of accepted rules. Berendsen succeeded in doing this after finding himself in the aisle and brushing shoulders with Gromyko as they moved together towards the platform. Berendsen 'brushed better' as he put it, and managed to get there first without actually running or hurrying.³²

With a remarkably modern awareness of the importance of media coverage Berendsen chose his time for speaking from the rostrum at the conference so that he would get maximum coverage on television and radio. His speech that

day was therefore the most widely publicised of the many he had made and enthusiastically received.³³ Its tone is measured. New Zealand, he said, would have welcomed some reasonable limitation of Japanese offensive armaments but nonetheless, New Zealand wished the Japanese well. 'We have no desire to hold Japan in bondage nor to reduce a proud, energetic and capable people to a status of inferiority,' he said. 'But geography has determined that Japan and New Zealand alike must live in the Pacific... Our concern has been security.'³⁴

Acknowledging that New Zealand's security apprehensions had been allayed by the tripartite security treaty Berendsen then went on to argue that in fact the peace treaty rested on a choice between leaving Japan an easy prey to communist aggression or the risk of abandoning restrictions of Japan's power to arm for defence. 'If it is a risk,' he said, 'it is a risk that we in New Zealand have taken with our eyes open as an earnest of the intention of our small country to play its part as a good neighbour in the Pacific. The onus is on Japan to fulfil this trust as we hope and believe Japan will fulfil it.'³⁵

Berendsen's term in Washington ended on 30 January 1953. He had arrived nine years earlier when New Zealand's policy was in a state of flux. He left having set the seal on a new era in New Zealand's foreign relationships. At San Francisco Berendsen made frequent reference to New Zealand as a Pacific nation and, in retrospect at least, the Japanese Peace Treaty and the ANZUS treaty seem to be a 'bench-mark' in New Zealand's development as a Pacific power. Certainly they represent a public acknowledgment that the United States rather than the United Kingdom must be the focus for New Zealand's future security. Hitherto New Zealanders had not, on the whole, recognised that they shared important concerns and responsibilities with their Pacific neighbours. Indeed, most of New Zealand's Pacific neighbours were an unknown quantity to New Zealanders in 1951. Berendsen's recognition that the Pacific was a region in which New Zealand's voice must be heard was new. Prime Minister Peter Fraser had said in 1941 that circumstances, in fact Japanese expansion, were forcing a new point of view on New Zealand. In the immediate post-war world, Japan remained a problem for New Zealand and acted as the catalyst for New Zealand's adherence to a new strategic relationship in the Pacific world.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 The comment of one of Berendsen's colleagues. Berendsen memoirs, (in possession of the family) Book II 1926-1944, Chapter XIX.
- 2 See Keith Sinclair, Walter Nash, Oxford, 1976, p.211.
- 3 U.K. High Commissioner in New Zealand (Sir Harry Batterbee) to Dominions Office, 26 September 1945, DO 35/2011. This despatch contains a number of interesting observations on the New Zealand scene at that time.
- 4 Berendsen memoirs Book III 1944-1952, Chapter XV.
- 5 The Australian-New Zealand agreement was signed on 21 January 1944 when Berendsen was High Commissioner in Canberra. See Robin Kay (ed.) Documents on New Zealand External Relations, Volume I, Government Printer, Wellington, 1972.
- 6 Alister McIntosh, 'The Origins of the Department of External Affairs', in F.L.W. Wood (ed.) New Zealand and World Affairs Volume I, N.Z. Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, pp.12-17.
- 7 Prime Minister's Press Statement, 13 December 1973; Interviews with Mr. Frank Corner, Wellington, Mr. Tom Larkin, Wellington, Mr. Charles Craw, Wellington, Mr. Jim Weir, Wellington, Professor Angus Ross, Dunedin.
- 8 See Gordon McLauchlan, The Passionless People, Auckland 1976.
- 9 F.L.W. Wood, The New Zealand People at War, Wellington, 1958. Chapter 5; J.V. Wilson 'New Zealand's Participation in International Organisations' in T.C. Larkin (ed.) New Zealand's External Relations, Wellington 1962, pp. 64-71.
- 10 See his statement before the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly 20 April 1948. N.Z. Department of External Affairs publication No. 61, 1948.
- 11 Robin Kay (ed.), Documents on New Zealand External Relations Volume II (hereafter cited as Documents NZEA II) Wellington, 1982, No.146, p.249; No.158, p.265.
- 12 P.J. Gibbons, 'The Climate of Opinion' in W.H. Oliver (ed.), The Oxford History of New Zealand, Oxford 1981, p.304.
- 13 The New Zealand Listener, Volume 6, No.145, 2 April 1942, p.7.
- 14 Robin Kay (ed.) Documents NZEA II, No.136, p.224.
- 15 Berendsen memoirs Book III 1944-1952, Chapter V.
- 16 Berendsen memoirs Book III, Chapter V.
- 17 Robin Kay (ed.) Documents NZEA II, No. 177, p.295-314; Dominion, Wellington, 1 March 1946.

- 18 Berendsen memoirs, Book III, Chapter V.
- 19 Robin Kay (ed.) Documents NZEA II, No.181, p.332; No.205, p.403; No.231, p.491; No.269, p.616.
- 20 Berendsen memoirs, Book III, 1944-1952, Chapter XVI.
- 21 "General Attitude to the Japanese Peace Settlement and the enforcement of the Peace Treaty" memorandum, 21 May 1947, Foreign Ministry Archives, 102/9/1; Robin Kay (ed.) Documents on New Zealand External Relations Volume III (hereafter cited as Documents NZEA III), Wellington 1985, No.105, p.285; No.118, p.340.
- 22 Interview with Mr. Frank Corner, Wellington, 3 October 1985.
- 23 Bruce Brown, New Zealand Foreign Policy in Retrospect, NZ Institute of International Affairs Wellington 1970, p.6-7; information provided by Mr. T.C. Larkin, Wellington, October 1985.
- 24 Robin Kay (ed.), Documents NZEA III No.198, p.523-24.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Robin Kay (ed.), Documents NZEA III No.200, p.545-46. The National Party won the election in November 1949. The new minister was Frederick Doidge.
- 28 "Summary of Sir Carl Berendsen's proposal for an alliance with the United States", memorandum, 9 February 1951, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, 102/9/46.
- 29 Robin Kay (ed.) Documents NZEA III, No.226, p.593-612.
- 30 Robin Kay (ed.) Documents NZEA III, No.283, p.744-46.
- 31 Interview with Sir Carl Berendsen 10 September 1964, John Foster Dulles oral history project Mudd Library, Princeton University.
- 32 Berendsen Memoirs Book III, Chapter XVI.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Robin Kay (ed.) Documents NZEA III, No.434, p.1164.
- 35 Ibid.

REMINISCENCES OF A MIS-SPENT YOUTH: TOKYO 1946-1949

by

Hans H. Baerwald

Nearly four decades have passed since my return to Tokyo during the summer of 1946. The United States Army had trained me to become an interpreter-translator in the Japanese language, first at the University of Michigan, later at Ft. Snelling (Minnesota) and the Presidio of Monterey (California). As was true of all 'language officers,' my first assignment was with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (A.T.I.S.) which functioned under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence). We were billeted in the N.Y.K. (Nippon Yusen Kaisha) Building opposite Babasaki-mon facing the Imperial Palace.

When I arrived, A.T.I.S. had a surfeit of linguists. There was little work, and we were kept occupied by translating and re-translating the new Constitution that was to be promulgated on 3 November 1946. Occasionally, we would be assigned to check the translation of a Japanese newspaper article in order to determine if the English bore any relation to the Japanese original. It usually did.

This languid existence was boring. I was full of youthful zeal and brimming with desire to use my language skills for constructive (I hoped) ends. It was to be several years before I learned why so many of us linguists were underemployed. Allegedly, General Charles Willoughby (General MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence) wanted to keep control over all

language specialists. He reasoned, or so we were told, that by virtue of our being among the essential links between the Occupation authorities and the Japanese Government, he could monitor -- through our reports -- essential communications between the occupiers and the occupied.

Fortunately, at least from my perspective, I was allowed to escape. My benefactress was Beate Sirota, who was my sister's best friend from pre-war years in Tokyo's American School in Japan. Over drinks one evening, she told me of an opening for a language officer in Government Section (GS) in which she was working. (GS was a 'special staff section' in SCAP Headquarters. Its domain was governmental and political reform, and its staff had written the draft of the new Constitution.) Beate told me that the work would be hard, but also exciting. The opportunity was far too good -- especially in comparison with the lack of any challenge in my ATIS assignment -- for me to refuse.

The transfer to GS was not automatic. Unbeknownst to me, I had become a pawn in the beginnings of a struggle for influence between General Willoughby and General Courtney Whitney, Chief of Government Section. Ultimately, Colonel David Tait, one of Willoughby's senior political advisers, intervened. He had been a neighbor in Tokyo in the 1930s. ATIS relented and allowed my orders assigning me to GS to be cut. So began nearly thirty months of hard labor. In retrospect, much of these efforts were mis-spent in the sense that they accomplished little. Of course, that was not my perception at that time, when exhilaration and purposefulness predominated.

Initially, my work was as a general interpreter. By the end of 1946, my superiors decided that most of my duties would be as a member of a GS sub-division which had various bland titles such as 'Public Administration Division,' 'Public Service Qualifications Division,' 'Statistics and Review Branch,' etc. In all instances, the substantive work concerned itself with what was officially known as the 'Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office (in Japan)' (SCAPIN 550) or colloquially as the 'Purge.' Its goal was nothing less than the elimination 'for all time (of) the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest' (Paragraph 6 of the Potsdam Declaration, 26 July 1945).¹

An overview of this entire program can be found in my The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation.² My purpose in this essay is to explore one of its specific aspects, that involving the Dai Nippon Butokukai. This organization's name initially was most commonly translated as 'The Great Japan Military Virtue Society,' but was also referred to subsequently as 'The Martial Arts Association of Greater Japan,' or 'Great Japan Chivalrous Society.' Obviously, these alternative appellations (in English) could render the society's purpose as either sinister or benign. A G-2 (Intelligence) cover-sheet to one of the first Occupation studies of the Butokukai, which recommended its dissolution, noted: 'A good case against the society is made. The name alone violates SCAP directives.'³

There are two inter-related themes to my tale. One has to do with bureaucratic politics inside MacArthur's Headquarters, i.e., SCAP. The second concerns itself with SCAP's early decision to exercise its authority

through the existing structure of the Japanese Government, rather than directly -- as it did, for example, in Okinawa.

GHQ Bureaucratic Politics

SCAP, as is well known, was a hybrid. It was a military headquarters with regular staff sections (G1-G4). It also consisted of a series of 'special staff sections' such as Government Section (GS), Civil Information and Education Section (CIE), Economic and Scientific Section (ESS), etc. Relations between and among these two distinctive bureaucracies, that came to their apex in MacArthur himself, were not always entirely friendly. That was probably inevitable as the career military dominated the regular staff, and the special staff contained a substantial group of civilians, some of whom began their service in uniform but who often ended their SCAP careers in mufti. In addition, there were individuals who remained in uniform but whose outlook was that of civilians, including myself.

Underlying attitudes also differed, although not necessarily along civilian vs. military lines. Some believed that the Potsdam Declaration's provisions and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's (SWNCC) directives that set forth the reform objectives of the Occupation should receive primacy. On most political issues, Government Section officials tended to support these views. Others believed that many of these reformist objectives were too radical, and that other considerations -- principally, the growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union -- should hold sway. The office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and its subsidiary agencies such as the Civil Intelligence Section (C.I.S.) and the Counter Intelligence Corps (C.I.C.) tended, albeit not during the first

year of the Occupation, to emphasize this outlook. Inevitably, these ideological differences became enmeshed in the on-going struggle for influence over General MacArthur himself, and became highly personalized. From my perspective, as a GS loyalist, General Courtney Whitney (Chief of Government Section) was a Knight in Shining Armor whereas General Charles Willoughby (the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence) was the personification of the Black Reactionary.

The antagonisms occasionally became ludicrous. I can remember being instructed not to discuss certain policy proposals, that GS was studying, with my fellow linguists who were friends but whose assignments were with one or another agency within G-2's far-flung bureaucratic empire. What gives me pause is that I received these instructions with great seriousness and did my best not to violate them. Bureaucratic politics can elicit zealotry of a high order.

Initially, during the summer of 1946 when the Butokukai problem surfaced, there was general agreement. G-2 had prepared a lengthy analysis of the organization, and recommended its formal dissolution. The case against the Butokukai was that: 1) Its goal, from its founding in 1895, had been to preserve the samurai spirit; 2) It propagated Japanese aggressive national sports; 3) Many of its leaders were militarists of the highest rank, including war-time Prime Minister Tojo Hideki; 4) During the Second World War, it had been used as a tool for the development of intense and militant nationalism and had supported bayonet practice and rifle marksmanship; 5) After the surrender, it was reorganized and no longer received Government subsidies, and its leadership was made up of senior police officials, some

of whom had had prior careers in the Thought Control Police or the Kenpeitai.⁴

The same Memorandum noted that the recommendation to dissolve the Butokukai had the concurrence of two CIC units, of the CIS, and of the CIE. Curiously, although "Government Section Concurs" is indicated, no signature was appended, even though GS had primary responsibility for all aspects of Purge policy. This minor oversight did not reflect a lack of agreement by GS, as will be made clear.

On the other hand, CI&E -- even though it had agreed -- assisted in delaying the Butokukai's official dissolution, possibly unwittingly. At issue was whether the organization should be allowed to dissolve itself. By doing so it could circumvent the provisions of the SCAP directive 'Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies and Other Organizations' (SCAPIN 548) that had been issued simultaneously with the 'Purge Directive' (SCAPIN 550) on 4 January 1946. If the Butokukai were listed as one of the organizations to be dissolved under SCAPIN 548, then it would have been automatically included under Category 'C' (Influential Members of Ultranationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies) of SCAPIN 550. That would have resulted in the purge of a substantial group of its leaders (founder, officers, directors, occupants of authoritative posts, editor of any publication, voluntary contributors). The Butokukai's leaders wished to avoid this possibility.

Hence, the organization decided to hold a national conference over the last three days of October 1946. Its leaders, in preparation for this event,

consulted certain CIE officials. In a Memorandum covering the meetings, one of the SCAP participants (Major Norviel) reported,

I think I am reasonably safe in saying that if the steps taken in the forthcoming conference [of the Butokukai] are sufficiently thorough and far reaching, it may not be necessary for any further action to be taken. But it will not be considered thorough unless the branches take the same kind of action as national headquarters⁵

If the CIE officials did give the Butokukai representatives the impression that self-dissolution was an available option, then they were contravening SCAP policy. They were also misleading the Japanese representatives at the meeting.

Government Section officials, almost simultaneously, had been preparing an official directive entitled 'Abolition (of the) Dai Nippon Butokukai,' under the provisions of SCAPIN 548. This written set of official instructions was never issued. Instead, they were delivered orally 'primarily because of assurances by officials of the Imperial Japanese Government that verbal order would be sufficient.'⁶ The substitution of oral, as against written instructions merely resulted in further delays. Everyone agreed that more study and analysis were needed. Earlier consensus within SCAP regarding the fate of the organization had been dissipated.

Two entirely different issues emerged. One was whether the organization had been 'militaristic' since its founding in 1895, or only during the wartime period when it had been taken over by the Government (January 1942-September 1945). The second was of much greater consequence and was raised by General Willoughby in a 'Check Sheet' from G-2 to GS.

One further consideration is the effect that adding this society to SCAPIN 548, and thus to SCAPIN 550, will have on the present government (the first Yoshida Shigeru Cabinet). If this new criterion, Dai Nippon Butokukai, is included in the purge without limitation, and, if the final date is set after 2 September 1945, three members of the Cabinet and the director of the Bureau of Public Safety of the Home Ministry will certainly be affected. If this number of its key personnel is purged the Cabinet is likely to fall We believe that barring unusual developments, the present government should be allowed to continue until the election of the new Diet in the Spring under the new constitution permits the choice of a successor cabinet with the backing of the people.⁷

Only three months had elapsed since General Willoughby had signed the Memorandum in which he had recommended dissolution of the Butokukai. Moreover, the Purge -- from its inception on 4 January 1946 -- had not been implemented with any concern for stability in Japanese politics. Quite the contrary had been the case. Finally, and most important of all, Willoughby (in the 16 November Memorandum) had noted that any individual, who might be affected by the extension of the Purge into local government, would be allowed to retain his position so long as he remained in his present post. There was no need, therefore, for G-2 to have been so solicitous about the possibly destabilizing impact of the Butokukai's inclusion in the purge criteria. For an explanation of this volte face, consideration must be given to what was transpiring inside the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Government Protects Its Own

As was noted earlier, SCAP did not govern Japan directly. The Occupation ruled through the existing structure of the Japanese Government. In most

respects, this dual structure worked remarkably well. Furthermore, the alternative -- that is direct administration -- probably would have been disastrous for the obvious reason that there were far too few occupationnaires who knew very much about Japan, let alone those who were fully conversant in the Japanese language.

This indirect form of government was particularly effective when the policies that the Occupation authorities set forth coincided with those of senior officials in the Japanese Government. For example, the initial objectives of the Purge which were to bar 'militarists' and 'ultranationalists' from public office -- while extremely obnoxious to those who were affected -- did not elicit strong objections from Japan's civilian bureaucrats. The vast majority of those affected came from the ranks of the career military and their political allies in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and its affiliated organizations. What made the Butokukai so controversial was that its possible inclusion in the Purge might affect a substantial number of civilian bureaucrats, whose well-placed colleagues fought an effective rear-guard action.

One element of their strategy was to provide SCAP with more and more information about the Butokukai. For example, in late November 1946, P.K. Roest -- then chief of Government Section's Political Affairs Division -- reported on new information that he had received from the Japanese Government. Its basic thrust was that the organization had been relatively benign until the Army had won control in 1942. Prior thereto, the society's conservative leadership had sought to resist the inclusion of militaristic ideas as well as the introduction of marksmanship and bayonet practice. He concluded his Memorandum,

.... From the material submitted by the Home Ministry it appears that the Butokukai could not be considered as an instrument of ultra-nationalism and militarism until the beginning of 1942, unless the athletics taught by the organization in connection with the Samurai code are themselves considered as evil. If that extreme position is taken the organization stands condemned from its inception in 1895.⁸

The Home Ministry's information, transmitted through the Central Liaison Office to Government Section, provided concrete evidence of one element of the defensive strategy: blame the Japanese military for any 'evil' activities of which the Butokukai might be accused. If that objective could be accomplished, then its civilian leaders -- characterized as conservatives who had resisted the militarists -- could be protected. This goal would be reached if the specific criteria affecting Butokukai officials were to be drawn as narrowly as possible.

A second element of the strategy was to take pre-emptive action. The Ministry of Home Affairs (Naimusho) issued its Ordinance No. 8 in November 1946, dissolving the Butokukai because 'during the war (emphasis added), the association became an instrument of the militarists.' Government Section, however, did not learn of Ordinance No. 8 until two months later, in late January 1947. Understandably, its issuance was interpreted as a subterfuge designed to avoid the society's inclusion in the Purge criteria.⁹

Government Section was not deterred. It continued to issue weekly verbal reminders to Japanese Government officials that the Butokukai should be included in the Purge criteria. Finally, Minister of Home Affairs Uehara

Etsujiro presented a petition (24 February 1947) to General Whitney. It emphasized that the association had been solely concerned with the propagation of certain kinds of athletics. It also conceded, however, that Government control during the war had forced the society to engage in 'coordinating military arts and ... the advancement of bayonet drill and shooting'¹⁰

General Whitney issued a written response (13 March 1947). It was the first instance of a non-oral communication on this subject from Government Section to the Japanese Government, and became the basis for SCAP policy. Leadership positions within the Butokukai henceforth would become part of the Purge. However, the specific criteria would be developed under the catchall Category G 'Additional Militarists and Ultra-nationalists' rather than Category C 'Influential Members of Ultra-nationalist, Terrorist or Secret Patriotic Societies.'¹¹

This compromise solution was fateful. It meant that detailed criteria had to be developed, as was true of the 'Economic Purge' affecting the business community and the 'Public Information Media Purge' affecting journalists, publishers, motion picture producers, etc. Under Category C there were specific lists of officers of a society that were to be designated as purgees. Category G, however, did not include such details so that affected positions had to be developed case-by-case. This process required six months to complete. As might have been anticipated, the criteria became models of the narrowest possible definition of who had been 'influential' in the Butokukai. For example, only the 'chief' of a local branch was included.¹²

During the course of these endless negotiations, the Home Ministry's officials added some novel provisions. Referred to as 'proof to the contrary' in the argot of that era, their principal purpose was to provide protection to those who faced designation as purgees because of having held listed positions in the Butokukai. They could do so by filing information with the screening committees that they had made 'positive attempts to obstruct the militarization of the association.'¹³ In all other portions of the Purge, this kind of counter-evidence was part of the appeals process that was available to anyone who had been designated as a purgee. Only Butokukai officials had the privilege of submitting petitions setting forth extenuating circumstances with their questionnaires that they submitted to the screening committees. No other example better illustrates the pervasive influence of Japan's civilian bureaucracy in having been able to influence policy so as to protect its officials from the Purge.

Concluding Comments

What did the inclusion of the Butokukai in the purge categories actually accomplish? During its heyday, at the beginning of the war in 1942, the society had had a membership of about three million. Shortly after Japan's surrender, its rolls had shrunk to about 80,000. Only 2,073 of the association's members were actually screened, and of these 1,312 (63.3%) were either barred or removed from public office -- that is, formally designated as purgees. Within this group, two-thirds were career bureaucrats most of whom had been in the Home Ministry, especially the police. Within the totality of the Purge itself (210,288 individuals) those designated under the Butokukai criteria accounted for six tenths of one percent!

These statistics stand in sharp contrast to some of the major categories of 'undesirables' whose careers were temporarily affected by having been purged. All career military officers were affected, and so were a very substantial number of those who had been leaders of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and its affiliates. These two groups, by themselves, included roughly seventy-five percent of the total number of 'purgees.'

One major factor that helps to explain this discrepancy is the timing of various elements in the Purge. The initial purge criteria were developed in the late Fall and early Winter of 1945, in the immediate aftermath of Japan's defeat. At that time, a fairly substantial level of reformist consensus prevailed inside SCAP Headquarters. Furthermore, the Purge had high priority and received consideration at the most senior levels of MacArthur's staff.

By contrast, the Butokukai criteria did not become final until the late summer (August) of 1947. By then, the purge had become highly controversial, in part because the Occupation's priorities had begun their inexorable shift from reform to recovery -- the so-called 'reverse course.' Moreover, officials in the Japanese Government had been able to increase their influence vis-a-vis the Occupation authorities with each passing month. Especially was this the case when the bureaucracy's interests were directly involved. The Butokukai's limited inclusion within the Purge is a perfect example of how this process worked.

In conclusion let me turn to the theme of my mis-spent youth. During the last six months of 1947, I was the principal person responsible for negotiating with the Japanese officials over matters affecting the Butokukai. At the time, I was a lieutenant and, as anyone who has served in a military headquarters knows all too well, there is no one who has lower status in an environment in which generals and colonels are to be found by the bushel. All of this, too, illustrates the depths to which the controversy over the Butokukai had sunk in GHQ's priorities.

Forty years ago I hardly had either the inclination or the time to give any of the foregoing much consideration. In retrospect, I was buoyed by those Japanese officials — those in the Secretariat of the Central Screening Committee, or in the Special Investigation Bureau of the Attorney General's Office (now, again, the Ministry of Justice) — who took their work in administering the Purge seriously. They were the ones who had to face the hostility of their erstwhile colleagues in the Home Ministry. My efforts may well have been mis-spent, but theirs were not, and they should be given far more credit than they — thus far — have been accorded. Doing so must await another occasion.

FOOTNOTES

1. Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan (hereafter PRJ). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949, Vol. II, p. 413.
2. Hans H. Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation. Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959.
3. GHQ, SCAP, G-2 Brief. Subject: Dissolution of Great Japan Military Virtue Society. To: General Willoughby. Signed 'JPP,' 15 August 1946 (HHB personal file).
4. MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, 13 August 1946, from Brigadier General C.A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (HHB personal file).
5. "Report of Conference," 24 October 1946, Radio Tokyo Room 201: Proposed Dissolution of the Dai Nippon Butokukai. Participants included UNO Yosaburo, Vice President and Chairman of the Board of Directors; MURAKAMI Hisaki, Managing Director, WATANABE Toshio, Director [All of the Butokukai]; Mr. OKIMOTO, Interpreter; Major Norviel, Major Graham, and Mr. Gibson [all of CI & E] (HHB personal file).
6. Draft of "History of the Purge: The Dai Nippon Butokukai Phase." 1 April 1948, pp. 3-4 (HHB personal file).
7. "Check Sheet." From: G-2 To: Gov't. Sect., 16 November 1946, signed C.A.W. [Charles A. Willoughby] (HHB personal file).
8. Government Section, "Memorandum for the Record," 26 November 1946, p. 2 (HHB personal file).
9. Draft of "History of the Purge: The Dai Nippon Butokukai Phase." 1 April 1948, p. 7 (HHB personal file).

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10. ibid., p. 6.
11. PRJ, Vol. I, p. 69.
12. PRJ, Vol. II, pp. 526-27.
13. Paragraphs I and II, Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947. PRJ, Vol. II, pp. 526-28.

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